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We test for an effect of Arizona’s 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) on the proportion 
of the state population characterized as foreign-born, as non-citizen, and as non-citizen 
Hispanic. We use the synthetic control method to select a group of states against which the 
population trends of Arizona can be compared. We document a notable and statistically 
significant reduction in the proportion of the Arizona population that is foreign-born and in 
particular, that is Hispanic noncitizen. The decline observed for Arizona matches the timing of 
LAWA’s implementation, deviates from the time series for the chosen synthetic control group, 
and stands out relative to the distribution of placebo estimates for the remainder of states in 
the nation. Furthermore, we do not observe similar declines for Hispanic naturalized citizens, 
a group not targeted by the legislation. Our results on LAWA’s impact on the housing market 
provide further support for our findings. 
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  Along with the large increase in the foreign-born population residing in the United 
States, there has been a concurrent increase in the size of the unauthorized immigrant population.  
Since the 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (legislation that 
adjusted the legal status of most unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. at the time) the 
undocumented immigrant population subsequently grew to approximately 3 million in 1990 and 
to roughly 11 million by 2009 (Passel and Cohn 2010).  Since 1986, there has been no 
comprehensive federal legislation intended to address the issue of unauthorized immigration, 
aside from efforts to strengthen border enforcement and executive branch driven surges in the 
enforcement of IRCA.  In fact, the country finds itself in much the same position that it did in 
1986.  There is a strong desire to gain control of immigrant flows into the country and to 
discourage future unauthorized immigration.   
The last few years have witnessed a sea of change in the traditional relationship between 
federal and state governments when it comes to immigration policy.  Absent new federal law, 
several states have passed legislation meant to control and deter unauthorized immigrants within 
their jurisdiction.  The provisions of these state laws vary, with some requiring that state 
contractors verify the identity and the eligibility to work of all employees and others making 
unauthorized employment a felony.  The intention of these laws is to increase the costs to 
employers and undocumented immigrants of unauthorized employment and to shift labor 
demand to authorized workers.  Proponents of such state legislation argue that strict enforcement 




  Arguably the most restrictive of such state legislation currently in place is Arizona’s 
Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA).  LAWA was passed in July 2007 and implemented in 
January 2008.  The law requires all employers to verify the identity and work eligibility of all 
new hires using the federal E-verify system, an online system that checks an individual’s 
information against Social Security Administration (SSA) and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) databases.  Employers who fail to comply face the loss of their business licenses.  In this 
paper, we assess whether the passage and implementation of LAWA has altered the demographic 
composition of the resident population of Arizona.   
Prior to the law’s passage, a sizable minority of the Arizona population was foreign-born 
(approximately 16 percent), with roughly 10 percent of the population non-citizen Hispanic, a 
subgroup containing a large fraction of unauthorized immigrants in the state. To the extent that 
undocumented immigrants responded to the law by moving away from Arizona or future 
undocumented immigration to the state was deterred by the legislation, these proportions should 
decline.  This internal compositional change may be further augmented by legal immigrants and 
perhaps the naturalized foreign-born leaving the state due to a change in perceived hostility 
towards immigrants or statistical discrimination on the part of employers.   
  We test for an effect of LAWA on the proportion of the state population characterized as 
foreign-born, as non-citizen, and as non-citizen Hispanic, groups with successively higher 
proportions of unauthorized immigrants.  We use the synthetic control method developed by 
Abadie et. al. (2010) to select a group of states against which the population trends of Arizona 
can be compared.  There are notable pre-post LAWA declines in the proportion of the population 
foreign-born, with much of the decline concentrated among non-citizen Hispanics.  Our 
estimates range from declines of one and a half to two percentage points.  The results from a  
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series of permutation tests that estimate placebo treatment effects for all states with no changes 
in immigration legislation corresponding in time with LAWA show that Arizona is consistently 
an outlier.  In nearly all such tests, the estimated relative decline in the Arizona foreign-born 
population is the largest.  To probe the robustness of these results, we perform a series of 
additional tests.  First, we assess whether there are comparable declines in the proportion of 
Arizona residents that are Hispanic naturalized citizens, a population whose employment 
prospects are not restricted by the legislation given that they are, by definition, authorized to 
work in the U.S.  We find no evidence of a relative decline in this population.  We also 
demonstrate that our results are robust to alternative definitions of the post-treatment period and 
are not being driven by spillover of population into neighboring states.  We test for differential 
effects of the legislation on immigrants at different points in the age distribution.  We find the 
largest impacts for working age immigrants.   
  Finally, we look for an impact of the legislation on the Arizona housing market.  Given 
that undocumented immigrants and the foreign-born are over-represented in rental housing, one 
would expect increases in rental vacancy rates as a result of LAWA-induced population loss but 
little impact on the vacancy rate for owner-occupied housing.  Applying the synthetic control 
estimator to quarterly vacancy rate data, we find a large pre-post LAWA increase in rental 
vacancy rates but no corresponding changes in owner-occupied housing vacancy rates. 
  We argue that the synthetic control method yields causal estimates of LAWA’s impact on 
population composition in Arizona. We provide evidence that the potential endogeneity of the 
policy change, the timing of the Great Recession, and other immigration enforcement measures 






2. The Impact of State Immigration Law on Population Movement 
  In recent years, there has been an unprecedented level of state legislative activity in the 
immigration policy domain.  In 2009, state legislatures passed 333 immigration-related pieces of 
legislation, compared to only 38 during 2005. Regarding employment specifically, between 2005 
and 2009, a total of 91 laws were enacted in 34 different states.
1  Many of these laws mandate 
the use of the federal E-Verify system for certain subsets of employers and impose penalties on 
both undocumented immigrants working illegally as well as on the employers that hire them.  
  Colorado was the first state to pass such legislation.  Colorado’s law requires any person 
or entity that has entered into a public contract with the state on or after August 2006 to certify 
that it has verified the legal status of all new hires using E-Verify. Similar laws or executive 
orders were enacted in Georgia in 2007, Rhode Island in 2008, Minnesota in 2008, Missouri in 
2009, and Utah in 2009.  South Carolina, Utah, and Mississippi have recently passed more 
expansive legislation that phases in an E-Verify mandate to all employers use according to firm 
size.  In South Carolina, employers of all sizes are required to use E-Verify by July 2010.  In 
Mississippi all employers will be required to use E-verify by July 2011.  Utah’s mandate covers 
all employers with 15 or more employees as of July 2010. Oklahoma constitutes a special case.  
While the first phase of the legislation was scheduled to go into effect in November 2007, a court 
challenge has held up implementation.  To date, Oklahoma has yet to implement the provisions 
of its bill. 
  Arizona enacted what is arguably the most comprehensive legislation in this realm. The 
Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) was signed into law in July 2007.  LAWA mandates the 
                                                 
1 Statistics cited in this paragraph are obtained from National Conference of State Legislatures (2006-2010).  
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use of E-Verify by all employers in Arizona to establish the identity and work eligibility of all 
new hires made after January 1, 2008.
2  The law imposes sanctions on employers who 
“knowingly” hire unauthorized immigrants including a business license suspension for the first 
offense and revocation upon a second.  To date, legal action taken against employers for 
violating the provision of LAWA has been quite rare.  As of April 2010, more than two years 
after implementation, only three employers have been indicted under the provisions of LAWA, 
and all of those in a single county (Maricopa).
3  This lack of sanctioning activity may reflect 
either weak enforcement of the law or a high degree of compliance on the part of Arizona 
employers. 
Employers in Arizona are increasingly using E-Verify.  In the state, the number of 
employers registered with E-Verify increased from less than 300 in March 2007 to over 38,000 
in January 2010.
4  Arizona’s enrollment is estimated to represent over one-third of all employers 
nationwide registered in the system and at least one-quarter of all employers in the state.
5  
Arizona’s employers are more than twenty times more likely to enroll than employers in 
California, another state with a large unauthorized immigrant population.
6 Thus LAWA appears 
to have had an initial, sizeable impact on employer enrollment in E-Verify.  Recent reports 
suggest that at least 700,000 new hires made between October 2008 and September 2009 were 
subject to E-Verify checks in Arizona.
7  This correlates to roughly 50% of all new hires.  Given 
this relatively high rate of usage as well as the high rate of enrollment, the potential effects of 
                                                 
2 Note that LAWA predates Arizona’s more recent and even more widely debated law, SB 1070 of 2010, which 
more directly targets immigrants themselves rather than employers.  Given that we measure the effects of LAWA in 
years completely predating passage of SB 1070, we do not expect that legislation to be driving our results. 
3Los Angeles Times (April 19, 2010). 
4 Westat (2009) and Arizona Attorney General’s Office (2010), respectively.  
5 Westat (2009), fraction nationwide as of June 2008, and Rosenblum (2009), fraction in Arizona as of February 
2009.  
6 Rosenblum (2009).   




LAWA are sizeable.  Furthermore, given these enrollment figures and the lack of sanctioning 
activity, we expect any observed effects to stem primarily from deterrence.   
  LAWA is distinctive among recent state legislation in that it was applied to all firms, 
rather than only those with public contracts, and all at once, rather than being phased in by firm 
size.  In addition, sufficient time has passed to permit evaluation of the laws impact on 
population and economic outcomes.  Importantly, Arizona has a large population of unauthorized 
immigrants (Passel and Cohen 2009a, 2009b). 
  To the extent that LAWA has made it more difficult for unauthorized immigrants to find 
work in Arizona, one would expect this to be reflected in the internal composition of state 
residents.  Specifically, those planning to migrate illegally to Arizona may have decided to 
migrate elsewhere.  Thus, undocumented migration may have contributed less to net population 
growth since the passage of LAWA than it would have in the absence of the legislation.  Second, 
some portion of the undocumented immigrant population residing in Arizona prior to the passage 
and implementation of LAWA may have chosen to leave due to perceived and/or actual 
increases in the difficulty of finding employment. 
  Aside from reductions in the undocumented immigrant population, the legislation may 
also induce legal immigrants and perhaps some native-born to leave the state.  This could occur 
through several channels.  Some legal immigrants, naturalized citizens, and native born may 
have family members (spouses, parents, siblings etc) who are undocumented.  Given that inter-
regional mobility often involves entire households, and sometimes multiple households, some 
individuals legally authorized to work in the U.S. may leave Arizona along with their 
undocumented family members and intimates.    
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  A further impetus to migration might occur through an increase in the difficulty finding 
employment among immigrants who are legally eligible to work in the U.S.  This might occur 
due to an increased in statistical discrimination by employers against immigrants or those with 
Hispanic surnames.  Alternatively, the E-verify system may in and of itself create more problems 
for the legal foreign-born.  The system essentially compares the name and social security 
numbers of new hires against existing SSA and DHS records.  If a match between provided 
information and the administrative records cannot be made, then the E-verify system returns a 
report of non-confirmation to the employer.  A formal evaluation of E-verify by Westat (2007) 
found that less than 1 percent of natives but almost 10 percent of foreign-born U.S. citizens 
received an erroneous non-confirmation of work authorization.  To the extent that such non-
confirmations make it more difficult to find and hold employment, legal foreign-born residents 
of Arizona may have an incentive to move elsewhere. 
  To be sure, aside from migration LAWA may impact undocumented immigrants that 
choose to remain in the state.  In particular, increased difficulty finding formal employment may 
lead to declining employment-to-population ratios or shifts towards informal work.  The law may 
also impact the degree to which remaining undocumented workers engage the state in other 
domains (reporting crime and victimization to the police, using emergency room services in 
county hospitals, enrolling children in school etc).  While these are certainly important topics for 







3. Empirical Methodology and Data Description 
  To assess the impact of LAWA on the internal composition of Arizona’s resident 
population, we analyze data from all monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data sets 
collected between January 1998 and December 2009.  We combine files within years and 
estimate the proportion of residents that is foreign-born, that is non-citizen, and that is non-
citizen Hispanic.  Ideally, we would like to identify the proportion undocumented among the 
state population.  However information on legal immigration status is not available in the CPS, 
or any suitable data source.  Nonetheless, the proportion undocumented is certainly greater 
among non-citizens than the foreign-born more generally and even greater still among Hispanic 
non-citizens.  Hence, by comparing trends among these nested population groups, we can assess 
whether any population shift is most likely driven by net out-migration of the undocumented.
8 
  Table 1 describes trends in these population groups for the period from 1998 to 2009.  
Recall, LAWA is passed in mid 2007 and implemented in January 2008.  Hence, the last two 
years constitute the post-treatment periods while population responses in 2007 are possible 
through migration in anticipation of LAWA’s implementation.  The proportion of Arizona 
residents that is foreign-born exhibits considerable stability between 1998 and 2006, increasing 
from 15 percent to 16.1 percent over this period.  Beginning in 2007, the proportion foreign-born 
begins to decline reaching 14.3 percent by 2009 (a decline relative to 2006 of 1.8 percentage 
points).  Turning to the sub-category of the foreign-born who are non-citizens, we observe a 
similar overall trend prior to 2006 although the increase in the proportion of Arizona residents 
                                                 
8 Estimates suggest that as of 2009, 80% of unauthorized immigrants nationwide were Hispanic, 58% were between 
the ages of 18-39, and the majority have fewer years of formal education (Passel and Cohn, 2010).  In the subgroup 
of “likely unauthorized” defined as Hispanic non-citizen immigrants of working age with no more than a high 
school diploma, we estimate that 90% in Arizona were unauthorized.  For example, our calculations from the 2008 
American Community Survey indicate that roughly 517,000 non-citizen Hispanic immigrants resided in Arizona in 
2008.  For this same year, Passel and Cohn (2009) estimate that there were 475,000 unauthorized immigrants in the 
state.  Similarly, for the “likely unauthorized” subgroup mentioned above, we estimate that 229,000 were in the 
labor market in Arizona in 2008 compared to the Passel and Cohn (2009) estimate of 240,000.    
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that are non-citizens is greater than the increase in the proportion foreign-born.  In addition, the 
post-2006 decline in this variable (of 2.6 percentage points) exceeds the decline for the overall 
proportion foreign-born.  Population trends among Hispanic non-citizens are similar.  There are 
slight increases in the proportion of the Arizona population described by this category between 
1998 and 2006.  Post 2006, we observe a decline of 2.6 percentage points.  
  The CPS inquires about the highest level of completed education for individuals 15 years 
and older.  Table 1 also present estimates of trends in the proportion of the state population 15 
years and older that falls into categories defined by nativity/immigration/Hispanic status and the 
level of educational attainment.  Looking first at the foreign-born category, we only observe 
post-LAWA declines in the proportion who are foreign-born and who have less than a high 
school degree.  Regarding the non-citizen category, the proportion of state residents that are non-
citizen and have less than a high school degree declines by 1.3 percentage points between 2006 
and 2009, while the proportion with a high school degree declines by 0.6 percentage points.  
There is no measurable decline among non-citizens with higher levels of schooling.  Similar 
patterns are observed when we restrict the focus to Hispanic non-citizens. 
  Hence, there is a notable pre-post decline in the proportion of Arizona residents that are 
foreign-born, with much of this decline attributable to declines in the population of Hispanic 
non-citizens.  Moreover, while the trends by educational attainment pertain to a subset of the 
Arizona population (those 15 and older), these more detailed calculations suggest that much of 
the relative population decline among the foreign-born was concentrated among relatively less 
educated immigrants.  As all three of these traits – non-citizen, Hispanic, and lower levels of 
educational attainment – are predictive of undocumented status (Passel and Cohen 2009a,  
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2009b), the raw patterns in Table 1 are consistent with a population response on the part of the 
undocumented to LAWA’s passage. 
  To assess whether the observed relative population declines of the foreign-born are being 
driven by a response to LAWA, we need to identify a comparison state or states that we can use 
to chart the counterfactual path of population trends for Arizona.  There are several strategies for 
constructing such a comparison group.  One possibility would be to select states that one could 
reasonably argue share similar population and economic characteristics; for example, all states 
bordering Arizona.  Comparable arguments could be made for using all states that share a border 
with Mexico.  An alternative strategy would be to employ a data-driven search for a comparison 
group based on pre-LAWA population characteristics and trends.  Here, we pursue this latter 
tack.
9 
  We employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie et. al. (2010) to chart a 
counterfactual post-LAWA path for Arizona.  Specifically, let the index j =(0,1,…,J) denote 
states.  The value j=0 corresponds to Arizona and  j=(1,…,J) correspond to each of the other J 
states that are candidate contributors to the control group (or in the language of Abadie et. al, the 
donor pool).  Define F0 as a 9x1 vector with elements equal to the proportion of the Arizona 
population that is foreign-born in years 1998 through 2006 (the nine years we use throughout this 
paper as our pre-intervention period).  Similarly, define the 9xJ matrix F1 as the collection of 
comparable time series for each of the J states in the donor pool (with each column 
corresponding to a separate state-level time series for the period 1998 through 2006). 
  The synthetic control method identifies a convex combination of the J states in the donor 
pool that best approximates the pre-intervention time series for the treated state.  Define the Jx1 
                                                 
9 We also conducted a traditional difference-in-difference approach with hand-selected comparison states and found 
similar results.  
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j w , and wj ≥ 0 for j=(1,…,J).  The product 
F1W then gives a weighted average of the pre-intervention time series for all states omitting 
Arizona, with the difference between Arizona and this average given by F0 -F1W.  The synthetic 
control method essentially chooses a value for the weighting vector, W, that yields a synthetic 
comparison group (consisting of an average of some subset of donor states) that best 
approximates the pre-intervention path for Arizona.  Specifically, the weighting vector is chosen 





where V is a 9x9, diagonal positive-definite matrix with diagonal elements providing the relative 
weights for the contribution of the square of the elements in the vector F0 -F1W to the objective 
function being minimized.
10 
  Once an optimal weighting vector W* is chosen, both the pre-intervention path as well as 
the post-intervention values for the dependent variable in “synthetic Arizona” can be tabulated 
by calculating the corresponding weighted average for each year using the donor states with 
positive weights.  The post-intervention values for the synthetic control group serve as our 
counterfactual outcomes for Arizona. 
                                                 
10 The Stata procedure developed by Abadie et. al. (2010) uses as the default a regression-based measure of V where 
those matching variables that are strong predictors of the dependent variable are given more weight and where the 
elements of V are normalized such that they sum to one.  Since we are matching on all pre-intervention annual 
values of the dependent variables, this default matrix provides fairly equal weight on the match for each year.  We 
have estimated all of these models constraining the weights in V to being equal (i.e., set V=I) across pre-intervention 
values and have also estimated fully nested models that choose both optimal values of V as well as W (as in Abadie 
and Gardeazabal 2003).  As the results were virtually indistinguishable from the results using the program’s default 
V, we report the default estimates throughout. 
W*= argmin
W (Fo − F1W )'V(F0 − F1W )
s.t.
W 'i =1, w j ≥ 0, for j = (1,...,J) 
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  Our principal estimate of the impact of LAWA on population outcomes uses the synthetic 
control group to calculate a simple difference-in-differences estimate.  Specifically, define 
Outcomepre
AZ  as the average value of the outcome of interest for Arizona for the pre-intervention 
period 1998 through 2006 and Outcomepost
AZ  as the corresponding average for the two post-
treatment years 2008 and 2009.  Define the similar averages Outcomepre
synth and Outcomepost
synth for 
the synthetic control group.  Our difference-in-differences estimate subtracts the pre-intervention 
difference between the averages for Arizona and synthetic Arizona from the comparable post-
intervention difference, or  
 
(2) 
To the extent that LAWA induced net migration of the foreign-born out of Arizona, one would 
expect to find that DDAZ < 0. 
  To formally test the significance of any observed relative decline in Arizona’s foreign-
born population, we apply the permutation test suggested by Abadie et. al. (2010) to the 
difference-in-difference estimator displayed in equation (2).
11  Specifically, for each state in the 
donor pool, we identify synthetic comparison groups based on the solution to the quadratic 
minimization problem in equation (1).  We then estimate the difference-in-difference in (2) for 
each state as if these states had passed the equivalent of a LAWA with comparable timing 
(passed in mid 2007 and implemented in January 2008).  The distribution of these “placebo” 
difference-in-difference estimates then provides the equivalent of a sampling distribution for the 
estimate DDAZ.  To be specific, if the cumulative density function of the complete set of DD 
                                                 
11 Buchmueller, DiNardo and Valletta (2009) use a similar permutation test to that described here to test for an 
impact of Hawaii’s employer-mandate to provide health insurance benefits to employees on benefits coverage, 
health care costs, wages and employment. 







estimates is given by F(.), the p-value from a one-tailed test of the hypothesis that DDAZ < 0 is 
given by F(DDAZ). 
  In selecting a synthetic control group for Arizona, we omit from the donor pool four 
states with broadly applied (in terms of employer coverage) restrictions on the employment of 
undocumented immigrants (Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah).  In addition, 
in identifying synthetic control groups for each of the remaining states in the donor pool, we 
omit Arizona.  Since Arizona experiences sharp declines in the foreign-born population pre-post 
LAWA, omitting Arizona from the donor pool for estimating the placebo intervention effects 
should impart a negative bias to these placebo estimates (a specification choice that should make 
it more difficult for us to find a significant effect). 
  Table 2 displays the states receiving positive weights in the construction of synthetic 
Arizona for our three outcomes of interest (essentially, the positive elements in the solution 
vector W*).  As can be seen, the states contributing to the synthetic control group as well as the 
weights assigned across states varies across the dependent variables.  For the proportion foreign-
born, seven states receive positive weights, with much weight going to traditional immigrant 
receiving states with relatively little weight on neighboring southwestern states.  The solution 
weighting vector for the proportion non-citizen places positive weight on five states, with 
considerably weight placed on California (almost half).  When we focus on Hispanic non-
citizens the lion’s share of weight is placed on California (0.747) with the remaining weight 






4. Validating the Identification Strategy 
Our empirical strategy requires that the enactment of LAWA represents an exogenous 
shock to the labor market.  For example, if high unemployment among the foreign born and the 
attendant problems led states to enact legislation attempting to discourage future migration to the 
state, any inference on the effect of such legislation on labor market outcomes would be 
compromised.  In fact, LAWA was debated and passed during a period of economic growth but 
was enacted at a time of declining labor market conditions in Arizona. 
  A number of facts suggest that the passage and enactment of LAWA was not driven by 
employment conditions in the state at the time but instead reflected Arizona’s perceived long-
term problem of unauthorized immigration, also experienced by other states.  To start, LAWA 
represents the ultimate manifestation of a fairly lengthy legislative debate that crossed multiple 
legislation sessions.  Moreover, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether LAWA would 
be enacted on January 1, 2008.  Federal lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of LAWA 
were brought by an alliance of civil rights advocates, business interests and immigrant rights 
groups.  The challenge was dismissed, but not until early December.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that those likely to be affected by actual implementation followed the court challenge 
and were conditioning their responses on the ultimate legal outcome (see The Arizona Republic, 
October 8, 2007). 
Although Arizona’s employment legislation has the potential to impact the labor market, 
a number of other forces also drive those conditions.  Under the synthetic control approach, 
unless the timing of these other forces was coincident with that of LAWA, we argue that our 
estimates represent the causal relationship between LAWA and Arizona’s population. This 
argument hinges on the ability of the synthetic control method to (1) match Arizona’s pre- 
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LAWA trends with those of other states and (2) determine whether Arizona’s pre-post changes 
stand out from the placebo estimates for all other states.  We will show in the following section 
that both of these conditions are satisfied.  Given that, we need only address the two major 
factors coincident with LAWA that could potentially invalidate the claim of causality. 
First, we are concerned about the potential coincidence of federal immigration 
enforcement increases with the enactment of LAWA.  We have reviewed DHS data and have 
found nothing to suggest that federal enforcement increases at the border or in internal 
investigations happened differentially in Arizona than in other border states and/or happened at 
exactly the same time.  The Arizona Border Control Initiative, which built up infrastructure on 
Arizona’s border with Mexico predated LAWA by a few years.  Further, our review of DHS 
arrest and apprehension data suggests that a similar percentage of all border apprehensions 
occurred in the Tuscon sector (about 42%) following LAWA and the number of arrests resulting 
from ICE investigations actually fell (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010). 
Second, the “Great Recession” occurred at approximately the same time of the enactment 
of LAWA. There is evidence that the recession reduced the inflow of new immigrants to the US 
and new immigrants to Arizona.  Our empirical approach comparing trends in Arizona to other 
states already accounts for any changes that affect the country as a whole (or the selected 
comparison states). However, one of the industries hit hardest, construction, is a leading 
employers of unauthorized immigrants.  Furthermore, construction is one of the biggest 
industries in Arizona (representing close to 11 percent of total private employment in 2006) so 
the state’s economy can be impacted significantly by declines therein.  Thus, it is important in 
our evaluation strategy to ensure that we do not attribute changes in population to LAWA if they 
were in fact driven by the decline in construction and real estate in Arizona specifically. To  
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validate our empirical approach, we assess official statistics on employment trends in Arizona 
and neighboring states during the recession. 
The recent recession caused a clear reduction in Arizona’s workforce. Figure A1 shows 
strong employment growth 2003-2006 with a noticeable slow down in 2007. This was followed 
by three and eight percent decreases in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Figure 3 also shows that the 
negative employment effects of the recession on employment were not any stronger in Arizona 
than it was in neighboring areas, including inland California (an area that shares many of the 
characteristics and trends of Arizona, is hence used in our empirical analysis). Lastly, an 
application of the synthetic cohort method to employment growth fails to reveal a LAWA effect 
in Arizona. 
Importantly, the recession was precipitated by a housing crisis, which brought new 
housing construction to a near standstill. The fact that many unauthorized immigrants are, or 
maybe more accurately were, employed in the construction sector means that they may have 
been particularly affected by the recession. However, a look at construction employment data 
reveals no evidence that Arizona’s construction industry fared much differently in the recession 
than its neighboring areas (Figure A2). 
Overall, the data indicates that while Arizona’s labor market was strongly affected by the 
recession, so were other states’, including its neighbors. The similarity in trends indicates that 







5. Basic Results 
  We begin with a graphical presentation of the Arizona population trends and the 
comparable population trends in synthetic Arizona for our three outcomes.  Figures 1 through 3 
present the proportion of each population that is foreign-born, that is noncitizen, and that is 
Hispanic non-citizen.  Focusing first on the pre-intervention period 1998 through 2006, the 
figures reveal that population trends for the synthetic control groups closely match corresponding 
population trends in Arizona.  Average pre-intervention differences between Arizona and the 
synthetic control groups are near zero for each outcome, with quite small root mean squared 
errors (.00197 for the proportion foreign-born, .00367 for the proportion non-citizen, and .00438 
for the proportion non-citizen Hispanic).  Hence, the synthetic control groups match the pre-
intervention values for Arizona quite well for each of the outcomes. 
  Regarding the post-intervention period, for each of the outcomes we observe sizable gaps 
(on the order of one to 2.5 percentage points) between Arizona and the synthetic control groups.  
For the foreign-born outcome, the gap begins to open up in 2007 and widens in each year 
thereafter.  For the proportion non-citizen and the proportion non-citizen Hispanic, the gaps 
relative to the synthetic controls do not widen until 2008, and are wider still by 2009.  Thus, the 
declines in the immigrant population observed in Arizona are not observed in states with 
comparable pre-LAWA population composition and dynamics. 
  Figures 4 through 6 graphically display the raw data needed to conduct the permutation 
test of the significance of the relative declines in Arizona.  Specifically, for each of the 46 donor 
states as well as for Arizona, the figures display the year-by-year difference between the 
outcome variable for the “treated” state and the outcome variable for the synthetic control.  The 
differences for each of the donor states are displayed with the thin black lines while the  
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differences for Arizona are displayed by the (red) thick line.  There are several notable patterns 
in these figures.  First, during the pre-intervention period 1998 through 2006, the differences for 
Arizona clearly lie within the distribution of placebo estimates, suggesting that Arizona is not an 
outlier during this period.  There are several states, California in particular, with very large pre-
intervention differences relative to its synthetic control group.  For California, this is driven by 
the fact that the state has the highest values for the dependent variables of all states in the donor 
pool, and hence it is impossible to match the state with a convex combination of other states. 
  Second, for the post intervention years as the difference values for Arizona turn negative, 
Arizona moves to the bottom of the distribution in each graph.  By 2009 the state becomes a 
visible outlier.  This pattern is observed for all three outcome variables, with the departures for 
Arizona particularly large in absolute value for non-citizens and Hispanic non-citizens. 
  Table 3 presents estimates of the difference-in-differences estimator laid out in equation 
(2) above.  For each outcome, the first column presents the mean difference between Arizona 
and the synthetic control for all years in the interval 1998 through 2006.  The second column 
presents the comparable average difference for 2008 and 2009 while the third column presents 
the difference-in-difference.  The fourth column presents where Arizona’s difference-in-
difference estimate ranks (with states ranked from lowest to highest) in the distribution created 
by combining the 46 placebo estimates for donor pool states with the estimate for Arizona.  The 
final column presents the P-value from the one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the relative 
change for Arizona is non-negative against the alternative that the difference-in-difference is 
negative.  Note, this P-Value is bounded from below by 0.021 (1/47). 
  The results in panel A show the estimates based on the entire resident population.  For all 
three outcomes, the average difference relative to synthetic Arizona is basically zero in the pre- 
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intervention period.  For the proportion foreign-born, there is a relative decline for Arizona of 1.8 
percentage points.  Arizona’s difference-in-difference estimate is the most negative, yielding the 
minimum P-value of 0.021.  The outcome for the proportion non-citizen shows a difference-in-
difference estimate of 1.7 percentage points.  Hence, the overwhelming share of the decline in 
the foreign born is driven by declines in the population of non-citizens.  Again, the estimate for 
Arizona has the most negative value relative to the distribution of placebo estimates.  Turning to 
the estimates for non-citizen Hispanics, the difference-in-differences estimate suggests a 1.5 
percentage point decline in the proportion of Arizona residents that fall into this category.   
Again, the Arizona estimate is the most negative. 
One can use the difference-in-difference estimates to calculate the net decline in 
population caused by the passage and implementation of LAWA.  In terms of actual people, 
Arizona’s population in 2006 stood at approximately 6.2 million.  These estimates suggest a 
relative population loss of between 93,000 and 112,000. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents comparable estimation results where the population is 
restricted to Arizona residents employed at a wage and salary job.  Here relative declines in the 
foreign-born population can be driven either by residential mobility or a pre-post LAWA 
increase in the degree of difficulty experienced by foreign-born workers when looking for work.  
The patterns in Panel B are basically comparable to the results based on the entire resident 
population.  The proportion foreign-born among the employed declines by 2.6 percentage points 
in Arizona relative to synthetic Arizona. The comparable estimate for non-citizens is 1.9 
percentage points, while the estimate for non-citizen Hispanics is 1.8 percentage points.  Again, 
the relative declines for Arizona are at the bottom of the distribution of placebo estimates for all 
of the states in the donor pool.  Note, the estimated impacts on the relative representation of the  
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foreign born (and the sub-populations therein) among the employed are larger than the 
corresponding estimates for the entire population.  This may be driven by either a dis-
employment effect of LAWA that reduces the representation of the foreign born beyond the 
impact of net migration, or perhaps a differential migration effect for foreign-residents of 
working age.  In the next section, we explore this in greater detail. 
To summarize the results, we find pre-post LAWA declines in the representation of the 
foreign born among the Arizona resident population.  Corresponding declines do not occur in the 
synthetic control group.  Most of the decline is concentrated among non-citizens and non-citizen 
Hispanics.  Moreover, we observe a decline in immigrant representation among those with jobs 
that exceeds the comparable decline among the state’s resident population more generally.  For 
all outcomes in both sets of estimates, the relative declines in Arizona fall in the extreme lower 
tail of the distribution of placebo estimates – i.e., the difference-in-difference estimates for 
Arizona are the most negative. 
 
6. Robustness Checks and Exploring Effect-Size Heterogeneity 
In this section, we probe the robustness of the main results and explore whether the 
population responses vary within sub-groups of the foreign-born population.  Specifically, we 
first assess whether the estimation results are sensitive to the definition of the post-treatment 
period and the extent to which cross-state spillover may be biasing our difference-in-differences 
estimates.  Second, we test for effects of LAWA on a series of alternative population and 
housing outcomes for which we have priors regarding the likely impact of the legislation.   
Finally, we assess whether the impact of LAWA on population movements varies by sub-groups 
of the immigrant population defined by age and gender.  
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A. Some specification checks 
We begin by exploring the sensitivity of the estimates to the definition of the post-
treatment period.  In Table 3, we define the post-period as calendar years 2008 and 2009 due to 
the fact that LAWA was implemented on January 1, 2008.  One might contend that 2007 should 
be included as a post-treatment year as the legislation was passed mid-2007 and households may 
have migrated in anticipation of the law’s passage and implementation.  In all of the estimates 
that we have presented thus far, we have not matched the treatment to the synthetic controls with 
2007 values and have omitted this year from our post-treatment period.   
Panel A of Table 4 presents comparable estimates to those in Panel A of Table 3, but that 
include 2007 in the post-treatment period.  Here we focus only on the results for all Arizona 
residents as we will explore age heterogeneity in greater detail below.  The relative population 
declines for Arizona including the 2007 population are somewhat smaller (by 0.3 percentage 
points for the foreign-born outcome, by 0.9 percentage points for the noncitizen outcome, and by 
0.6 percentage points for the noncitizen Hispanic outcome).  However, it is still the case that the 
declines for Arizona are the largest when compared to the distribution of placebo estimates 
across the 46 potential donor states.   
Clearly, 2007 is a problem year.  One might expect an anticipatory effect prior to 
implementation and hence would not want to match on the 2007 value.  However, any 
anticipatory effect should be small as the mandatory use of E-verify does not commence until 
January 2008 and since the enhanced verification requirement did not apply retroactively to past 
hires.  This latter fact alone suggests that the proportion of pre-LAWA Arizona residents 
impacted by the law should increase with time and that the initial impact prior to implementation  
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should be small.  Based on this reasoning, we prefer the estimates in Table 3 that omit the 2007 
values from any calculations. 
An additional issue concerns potential bias caused by population spillover created by 
migration out of Arizona into other states across the nation.  Specifically, Arizona’s population 
loss may be due either to deterred future migration, foreign migrants leaving the country, or 
migrants leaving for other states.  If the latter is an important contributor to state population 
among those states contributing to the synthetic control group, then the suitability of the post-
treatment path for the synthetic control group in charting the counterfactual for Arizona is 
compromised.  This might be a particularly important source of bias if migrants leave Arizona 
for California since California contributes disproportionately to the synthetic control group for 
each of the outcomes we analyze. 
In the current application, there are several reasons to believe that such spillover is 
quantitatively unimportant.  To start, the absolute declines in the proportion of the Arizona 
population that falls into our three categories are comparable in magnitude to the declines 
measured relative to the synthetic controls.  For example, averaging the pre and post-intervention 
values in Table 1 using the period definitions employed in Table 3 shows an absolute decline in 
the proportion of Arizona residents that are foreign born of 1.4 percentage points (compared with 
our difference-in-difference estimate of 1.8 percentage points).  The comparable absolute 
declines for foreign-born Hispanic and noncitizen Hispanics are 1.6 and 1.3 percentage points, 
respectively.  Hence, the relative declines that we estimate in Table 3 are driven primarily by 
compositional changes in Arizona rather than compositional changes in the states contributing to 
the synthetic control groups.  
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Second, Arizona is a small state.  The impact of a modest population decline in Arizona 
on the population of neighboring states is bound to be small.  For example, Arizona’s 2007 
population stood at approximately 6.25 million persons.  Our difference-in-differences estimates 
suggest that the proportion foreign-born declined by 1.8 percentage points.  Relative to 2007, this 
corresponds to a LAWA-induced absolute population loss of roughly 112,000. Suppose that the 
entire 112,000 foreign-born moved to neighboring California (the only state bordering Arizona 
that contributes to the synthetic control in any of our comparisons).  Such a population move 
would increase the proportion of California residents that are foreign born from the actual value 
in 2007 of 0.283 to the hypothetical value of 0.286.  Moreover, since California never 
contributes more than 75 percent to the synthetic controls for any of our outcomes, the impact of 
such cross-border spillover on the post-treatment values for the synthetic control would be even 
smaller than what is implied by this hypothetical exercise. 
  Finally, when we restrict the donor pool to states that do not share a border with 
Arizona
12 the difference-in-difference estimates as well as the statistical inferences are quite 
similar to our estimates in Table 3.  Since one might expect the largest effects of population 
spillover on the populations of neighboring states, omitting these states from the donor pool 
provides a key robustness check.  These results are presented in Panel B of Table 4.  Omitting 
the states that share any border with Arizona yields difference-in-difference estimates that are 
essentially the same as those that include these states in the donor pool (the estimates reported in 
Table 3).  Moreover, the observed DD estimates for Arizona are still more negative than each of 
the remaining 43 placebo estimates for all three outcome variables.   
 
                                                 
12 Throughout the analysis we have been omitting Utah from the donor pool due to the presence of comparable (yet 
not identical) state legislation.  In the tabulations in Table 4 Panel B we further drop California, Colorado, Nevada, 
and New Mexico from the potential donor pool.  
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B. Testing for Effects of LAWA on Alternative Population and Population-Related Outcomes 
  The enhanced employment verification requirements of LAWA are targeted specifically 
at foreign-born job seekers that are unauthorized to work in the United States.  Thus, to the 
extent that there is a migratory response to the legislation, one would expect the largest 
population impact on groups with high proportions unauthorized.  Conversely, while legal 
immigrants may also leave the state due to social connections with unauthorized immigrants, due 
to increased discrimination against all foreign-born, or due to a perceived increase in hostility 
towards immigrants, one would expect smaller population changes among the authorized.   
Hence, one key falsification check is to test for an impact of LAWA on the proportion of the 
Arizona population that is foreign born yet legally residing within the state. 
  In addition, a sudden change in population should have derivative impacts on other 
outcomes.  Perhaps the most obvious place to look would be the Arizona housing market.  As we 
will soon document, immigrants accounted for a relatively large share of households residing in 
rental housing in pre-LAWA Arizona.  Moreover, the majority of the Arizona population resides 
in owner-occupied housing.  In conjunction, these two facts suggest that a LAWA-induced 
population loss should have a larger impact on the market for rental housing than on the market 
for owner-occupied housing.  
  In this sub-section we present evidence pertaining to these falsification tests.  We begin 
by testing for an impact of LAWA on the proportion of Arizona residents that are Hispanic, 
naturalized citizens.  Figure 7 displays trends in the proportion that are Hispanic naturalized 
citizens for Arizona and for the synthetic control for Arizona for the period 1998 through 2009.  
Relatively few Arizona residents fall into this category, with the highest value for Arizona of 
approximately 0.03 in 2009.  Despite a dip in this series in 2007, the proportion of Arizona  
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residents that are Hispanic naturalized citizens appears roughly stable through the 
implementation of LAWA.  Figure 8 displays the difference for each year between Arizona and 
the synthetic control group along with the placebo difference series for each of the 46 states in 
the donor pool.  The drop in this variable in 2007 for Arizona certainly stands out.  However, by 
2009 the difference for Arizona lies well within the distribution of placebo estimates for the 
other states.   
  The first row of Table 5 presents the results from applying our difference-in-difference 
estimator to this particular dependent variable.  For the period 1998 through 2006 the average 
difference between Arizona and its synthetic control group is zero.  For the two post-intervention 
years (2008 and 2009), the difference widens slightly to -0.003.  This ranks fifth out of the 47 
estimates yielding a P-value of the one-tailed test for a decline in this population variable of 
0.106.  Taken together with the patterns documented in Figures 7 and 8, there appears to be little 
evidence that naturalized Hispanics responded to LAWA by migrating from the state. 
  Regarding the Arizona housing market, prior to the passage of LAWA the foreign-born in 
Arizona were disproportionately concentrated in rental housing.  Our tabulations of data from the 
2006 American Community Survey (ACS) show that among Arizona households headed by the 
foreign-born, roughly 41 percent resided in rental housing compared with 28 percent of 
households headed by the native born.  Among households headed by a noncitizen, 53 percent 
rent, while the comparable figure among households headed by a Hispanic noncitizen is 56 
percent.  The relatively high proportion of immigrants in rental housing combined with the fairly 
sizable foreign-born population in Arizona naturally implies that immigrants comprise a fairly 
large portion of the demand side in Arizona’s market for rental housing.  Indeed, in 2006 
immigrant-headed households occupy over one fifth of the state’s rental housing.  The  
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comparable figures for noncitizen and noncitizen Hispanic households are 17 and 14 percent, 
respectively. 
  Given the relative concentration of immigrants in rental housing, population losses on the 
order implied by our difference-in-difference estimates in Table 3 should disproportionately 
impact the Arizona rental market.  Here we asses this proposition by testing for pre-post LAWA 
changes in the rental housing vacancy rate and the owner-occupied housing vacancy rate.  To do 
so, we use quarterly vacancy rate data from the first quarter of 2005 through the last quarter of 
2009 from the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey (CPS/HVS).  We apply the 
synthetic control procedure to these data to identify a rental vacancy series for synthetic Arizona 
and then use this series to calculate difference-in-difference estimates for these housing 
outcomes.  Since we have quarterly data, we define the pre-intervention period as all quarters 
prior to quarter three 2007.  To identify the states contributing to the synthetic control, we match 
on annual average vacancy rates for the pre-intervention period as well as the seasonal averages 
of these values (the average of the three quarter one values, the three quarter two values etc) to 
adjust for seasonal variability in vacancy rates.  In addition, we match on a number of covariates 
that are likely predictors of housing market vacancy rates.  In particular, we match on pre-
intervention values of the proportion of state residents in metropolitan areas, the age distribution 
of state residents (proportion under 18, 18 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 64, and 65 and over), 
the proportion nonwhite, the proportion Hispanic, the proportion foreign-born, the proportion 
poor, and the proportion that rent.  We tabulate these covariates from the 2005 through 2007 
American Community Survey. 
  Before discussing the estimates, it is instructive to work through a simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation regarding the likely size of the impact one might expect from a sudden  
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decline in the foreign-born population on housing vacancy rates.  In 2006, renters account for 
29.8 percent of Arizona households.  Our main difference-in-difference estimate suggests that 
LAWA reduced the proportion of the Arizona population that is foreign born by 0.018.  If we 
assume that this translates into a 1.8 percentage point decline in the number of Arizona 
households
13 and that the entirety of this decline occurs among rental households, then the rental 
vacancy rate should increase by 6.04 percentage points ([1.8/29.8]x100).  
  Figure 9 displays the quarterly rental vacancy rates for Arizona and the synthetic control 
for 2005 through 2009 (quarters are labeled relative to quarter three of 2007).  There is a 
pronounced increase in rental vacancy rates starting in the first quarter of 2008 that progressively 
increases through 2009.  There is no corresponding increase among the synthetic control group.  
Figure 10 displays the differences between Arizona and the synthetic control by quarter 
alongside the comparable differences for each of the 46 states in the donor pool.  The time series 
for Arizona lies squarely within the placebo distribution pre-LAWA but becomes a clear outlier 
with the largest values post-implementation.  Figures 11 and 12 present comparable graphs for 
the owner-occupied vacancy rates.  In Figure 11 we observe similar post-LAWA trends in 
vacancy rates for Arizona and the synthetic control states.  Moreover, relative to the 46 placebo 
estimates, the difference between Arizona and the synthetic controls (displayed in Figure 12) are 
not indicative of an impact of LAWA on this variable. 
  The last two rows of Table 5 present difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of 
LAWA on the rental vacancy rate and the owner-occupied vacancy rate.  The synthetic control is 
                                                 
13 A decline in the foreign-born population would impact both the numerator as well as the denominator of the ratio 
use to calculate the proportion foreign born, and thus a decline in the proportion foreign born of 0.018 implies a 
slightly smaller percentage population loss.  However, to a first approximation assuming a 1.8 percentage point 
decline is reasonable.  Moreover, we are applying the population change to changes in the number of households.  
To the extent that immigrant households are larger, the implied change in the rental vacancy rate would be smaller 
than is suggested by this calculation.  
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quite closely matched to pre-intervention Arizona values, as is evident by the small average 
differences in vacancy rates for the pre-intervention period.  During the post-intervention 
quarters, the difference in rental vacancy rates between Arizona and synthetic Arizona increase 
to 5.8 percentage points.  Moreover, given the trivial pre-intervention average difference, the 
difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of LAWA on rental vacancy rates is quite close to 
the post-treatment difference in means (the DD stands at 5.6 percentage points).  Note, this 
estimate is quite close to the value that we derived from our back-of-the-envelope calculation.  
Regarding statistical inference, the pre-post LAWA increase in relative rental vacancy rates for 
Arizona exceeds 45 of the 46 placebo estimates for the pool of donor states, yielding a P-value of 
0.043.  
  By contrast, there is no evidence of an impact of LAWA on the owner-occupied vacancy 
rate.  There is a slightly negative average pre-intervention difference between Arizona and 
synthetic Arizona in the owner-occupied vacancy rate that turns slightly positive post-
intervention.  The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that the owner-occupied vacancy 
rate increases in Arizona by less than half a percentage points.  The magnitude of this increase 
places Arizona 41
st out of the 47 states (ranked from smallest to largest values) with an implied 
P-value of 0.149.  Hence, we cannot conclude using the permutation test that the slight increase 
in the owner-occupied vacancy rate is statistically significant. 
C. Testing for heterogeneity in the population response by age and gender 
  Our final set of results assesses whether the migratory responses to LAWA vary within 
subsets of the foreign-born population defined by age and gender.  There are several reasons that 
support an a priori expectation for heterogeneity in the impact of the law.  First, the fact that 
LAWA does not apply retroactively to all past hires suggests that those in relatively stable  
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employment relationships may be less impacted by the law’s enhanced verification requirements.  
Hence, one might expect greater stability and less of an impact on the relative representation of 
immigrants among relatively older Arizona residents.  Second, children under 16 years of age 
generally do not work, and hence are not directly impacted by the law.  Nonetheless, foreign-
born children may be forced to migrate with parents who now face greater difficulty in finding 
employment as a result of LAWA.  Finally, there is a fair degree of gender imbalance in the 
immigrant population, especially among more recent immigrants from Latin American (Raphael 
2010).  To the extent that male immigrants are more recent, more likely to be undocumented or 
perhaps more salient in that they are more likely to seek formal employment, one might expect 
differential impacts by gender. 
  Table 6 presents the results from difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of 
LAWA on the relative proportion in each immigrant category for three age groups: those under 
16 years of age, those 16 to 45 years of age, and those 46 years of age and older.  Beginning with 
children, for all three outcomes we observe declines in the proportion immigrant, with most of 
the decline being concentrated among children that are Hispanic noncitizens.  The difference-in-
difference estimates range from 1.4 to 2 percentage points and in each instance, the value for 
Arizona is less than all of the placebo estimates for the remaining states.  The results for 
immigrants in the prime working age range (16 to 45) are similar yet somewhat larger than the 
results for children.  Point estimates range from relative decline of 2.7 to 2.8 percentage points.  
Again, the difference-in-difference estimates for Arizona are in the far left tail of the distribution 
of placebo estimates.  We find no evidence of an impact of LAWA on the proportion foreign-
born, the proportion noncitizen, nor the proportion Hispanic noncitizen among Arizona residents 
46 years and older.  
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  Finally, Table 7 focuses on the 16 to 45 year age range and presents separate estimates by 
gender.  For the proportion foreign-born outcome, there is some evidence that the law had a 
larger impact on the representation of immigrants among men in Arizona relative to women, 
with the male difference-in-difference estimate exceeding the female estimate by one percentage 
point (in absolute value).  However, the estimates for the proportion noncitizen and the 
proportion noncitizen Hispanic are essentially identical.   
 
7. Conclusion 
  The findings in this study are several. First, we document a notable and statistically 
significant reduction in the proportion of the Arizona population that is foreign-born and in 
particular, that is Hispanic noncitizen.  The decline observed for Arizona matches the timing of 
LAWA’s implementation, deviates from the time series for the chosen synthetic control group, 
and stands out relative to the distribution of placebo estimates for the remainder of states in the 
nation.  Second, we do not observe similar declines for Hispanic naturalized citizens, a group not 
targeted by the legislation.  Furthermore, we observe corresponding increases in rental vacancy 
rates that are quite close to what one would expect based on our estimates of the net population 
loss.  This increase in rental vacancy rates is statistically significant using the standards of the 
permutation test we employ in this project. Moreover, we do not observe similar increases in the 
vacancy rate for owner-occupied housing. This is sensible as those most likely to be impacted by 
the law (undocumented immigrants) are disproportionately concentrated in rental housing. 
  Finally, we find significant population loss among foreign-born children and working age 
immigrants with the largest proportional declines observed for those between 16 and 45 years of  
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age.  We do not find declining representation of the foreign born among Arizona’s population 
that is 46 years of age and older. 
  While the focus of this paper has been on net changes in the internal composition of the 
state’s population, there are a number of additional questions that naturally arise from the 
findings that we present.  First, in addition to studying the impact of legislation such as LAWA 
on migration decisions, one might also be concerned with the impact of the law on immigrants 
(both undocumented as well documented) that remain behind.  In particular, the increased use of 
E-verify in conjunction with the threat of sanctions for employers that do not comply must 
reduce the proportion of employers willing to hire the undocumented.  Among those 
undocumented immigrants who remain behind, one might expect to observe reductions in 
employment, increases in informal employment, and perhaps decreases in wages among those 
who are employed.  Moreover, legal immigrants who may not choose to migrate out of Arizona 
due to LAWA may still experience increased discrimination or E-verify induced bureaucratic 
hurdles in procuring employment.  There is some evidence that the introduction of employment 
eligibility requirements and employer sanctions with the 1986 passage of IRCA may have caused 
discrimination against Hispanics legally eligible to work in the U.S. (Bansak and Raphael 2001).  
The impact of LAWA on the employment outcomes of legal immigrants should certainly be 
addressed in further research. 
  Finally, the population changes documented here, and in particular the declining 
representation of immigrants among the employed, suggests that LAWA may serve as an 
additional opportunity to study the impact of immigrant labor competition with natives on the 
employment outcomes of the native born (a la Card 2001, 2005, Borjas 2003, Ottaviano and Peri 
2008).  LAWA intended to divert labor demand from the unauthorized foreign born to legal  
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workers in the state, the majority of which will be comprised of the native born.  Further work 
should focus on theoretically modeling the exact channels through which such demand diversion 
would impact the employment outcomes of the native born and then empirically estimate the 
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Comparison of the Proportion Foreign-Born in Arizona and in the Synthetic Comparison 












































































Figure 4: Difference in the Proportion Foreign-Born Relative to the Synthetic Control 
Group, All States (Arizona Displayed with Thick Red Line) 
 










































































































Figure 5: Difference in the Proportion Non-Citizen Relative to the Synthetic Control 
Group, All States (Arizona Displayed with Thick Red Line) 
 
Figure 6: Difference in the Proportion Non-Citizen Hispanic Relative to the Synthetic 
































































































































Figure 8: Difference in the Proportion Hispanic Naturalized Citizen Relative to the 
Synthetic Control Group, All States (Arizona Displayed with Thick Red Line) 
 
 







































































































Figure 10: Difference in Rental Vacancy Rates Relative to the Synthetic Control Group, All 
States (Arizona Displayed with Thick Red Line) 
 
 












- 1 0 - 9- 8- 7- 6- 5- 4- 3- 2- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9



















































































-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9





Figure 12: Difference in Owner-Occupied Housing Vacancy Rates Relative to the Synthetic 
Control Group, All States (Arizona Displayed with Thick Red Line) 
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Quarter Relative to Intervention Quarter (2007Q3)Table 1 
Trends in the Proportion of Arizona Residents that Are Foreign-Born, that are Non-Citizens, and that are Hispanic Non-
Citizens, all Residents and by Education for Residents 15 Years of Age and Older, 1998 to 2009 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Foreign Born 
 
  Less then HS 
  HS grad 
  Some college 
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  Some college 
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  Some college 










































































Tabulated using all monthly Current Population Surveys between 1998 and 2009. 
  
Table 2 
States Receiving Positive Weights for the Synthetic Control Groups
Proportion Foreign-Born  Proportion Non-Citizen Proportion  Hispanic  Non-
citizen 
Alaska  0.091 California  0.441 California  0.747 
California  0.161 DC  0.028 Maryland  0.122 
Hawaii  0.197 New  Jersey  0.118 North 
Carolina 
0.131 
Idaho 0.034 North 
Carolina 
0.171 -  - 
New  York  0.225 Washington  0.242 -  - 
Oregon  0.240  - - - - 
Washington  0.145  - - - - 
Weights come from the solution to the quadratic-minimization problem displayed in equation 
(2). 




Estimated Impact of the Passage and Introduction of LAWA on Various Sub-Sets of the 
Foreign-Born Population of Arizona 






















Panel A: As a proportion of all Arizona residents 
Foreign-born 
 








0.000 -0.015 -0.015 1/47  0.021
Panel B: As a proportion of employed Arizona Residents 
Foreign-born 
 








0.000 -0.018 -0.018 1/47  0.021
Average differences pre and post-intervention are estimates of the difference in the proportion of 
the Arizona population in the given category relative to the matched synthetic comparison group.  
The one-tailed test of the significance of the difference-in-difference estimates employ the 
empirical distribution of the placebo-effect estimates of LAWA for 46 additional states. 
 




Alternative Difference-in-Differences Estimates Including 2007 as a Post-Treatment Year 
and Excluding States Bordering Arizona from the Potential Pool of Contributing States to 
the Synthetic Control  






















Panel A: Including 2007 as a Post-Treatment Year 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 -0.015 -0.015 1/47  0.021
Noncitizen 
 




0.000 -0.009 -0.009 1/47  0.021
Panel B: Dropping States that Border Arizona from the Donor Pool 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 -0.019 -0.019 1/43  0.023
Noncitizen 
 




0.008 -0.014 -0.022 1/43  0.023
Average differences pre and post-intervention are estimates of the difference in the proportion of 
the Arizona population in the given category relative to the matched synthetic comparison group.  
The one-tailed test of the significance of the difference-in-difference estimates employ the 
empirical distribution of the placebo-effect estimates of LAWA for 46 additional states in panel 
A and 42 additional states in panel B. 
a. For the estimates in panel A, the post-intervention period includes the years 2007, 2008, and 
2009.  For the estimates in Panel B, the post-intervention period includes the years 2008 and 
2009Table 5 
Estimated Impact of the Passage and Introduction of LAWA on Hispanic Naturalized 
Citizens, on Rental Vacancy Rates and on Vacancy Rates for Owner-Occupied Housing 
 Average  pre-
intervention 
difference 





































0.085 0.554 0.469 41/47 0.149
Average differences pre and post-intervention are estimates of the difference in the outcome for 
Arizona relative to the matched synthetic comparison group.  The one-tailed test of the 
significance of the difference-in-difference estimates employ the empirical distribution of the 
placebo-effect estimates of LAWA for 46 additional states. 
a. The pre-intervention values for the proportion Hispanic naturalized citizen outcome are the 
annual values for the period 1998 through 2006.  The pre-intervention values for the vacancy rate 
outcomes are the quarterly values for the period 2005Q1 through 2007Q2. 
b. For all outcomes, the post intervention period pertains to 2008 and 2009.  For the rental 
vacancy rates, the post-intervention values are measured quarterly while for the proportion 
naturalized Hispanic citizen, the values are annual. 
c. Values in this column are the p-values of a one-tailed test of the null that the Arizona DD 
estimate is non-negative against the alternative of a negative value for the proportion of residents 
that are Hispanic naturalized citizens.  For the housing vacancy rates, the test statistics are the p-
values of a one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the vacancy rates are non-positive against 
the alternative of an increase in vacancy rates. 




Estimated Impact of the Passage and Introduction of LAWA on Various Sub-Sets of the 
Foreign-Born Population by Broad Age Groups 






















Panel A: Population under 16 
Foreign-born 
 
0.001 -0.018 -0.019 1/47  0.021
Noncitizen 
 




0.006 -0.008 -0.014 1/47  0.021
Panel B: Population 16 to 45 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 -0.027 -0.027 1/47  0.021
Noncitizen 
 




0.000 -0.028 -0.028 1/47  0.021
Panel C: Population 46 and Older 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 30/47 0.638
Noncitizen 
 




0.000 -0.001 -0.001 11/47  0.234
Average differences pre and post-intervention are estimates of the difference in the proportion of 
the Arizona population in the given category relative to the matched synthetic comparison group.  
The one-tailed test of the significance of the difference-in-difference estimates employ the 
empirical distribution of the placebo-effect estimates of LAWA for 46 additional states. 




Estimated Impact of the Passage and Introduction of LAWA on Various Sub-Sets of the 
Prime Working Age Foreign-Born Population by Gender 






















Panel A: Males 14 to 65 Years of Age 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 -0.035 -0.035 2/47  0.043
Noncitizen 
 




0.000 -0.021 -0.022 2/47  0.043
Panel B: Female 14 to 65 Years of Age 
Foreign-born 
 
0.000 -0.025 -0.025 1/47  0.021
Noncitizen 
 




0.001 -0.021 -0.023 1/47  0.021
Average differences pre and post-intervention are estimates of the difference in the proportion of 
the Arizona population in the given category relative to the matched synthetic comparison group.  
The one-tailed test of the significance of the difference-in-difference estimates employ the 





Figure A1: Annual Employment Growth in Arizona and Bordering States, 1999-2009 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the 1998-2009 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) 
 
Figure A2: Annual Employment Growth in Construction in Arizona and Bordering States, 
1999-2009 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the 1998-2009 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) 